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We introduce SemanticLock, a single factor graphical authentication solution for mobile devices. SemanticLock uses a set
of graphical images as password tokens that construct a semantically memorable story representing the user‘s password.
Passwords are entered via the familiar and quick action of dragging and dropping the images into their respective positions
on the touchscreen. It is well known that for locking mechanisms such as PIN or PATTERN that users tend to pick memorable
passwords such as dates or simple geometric shapes, signicantly reducing the eective password space for these mechanisms.
e authentication strength of the SemanticLock is based on the large number of possible semantic constructs derived from
the positioning of the image tokens and the type of images selected. While graphical passwords have been shown in some
cases to have lower entropy than other password types, we avoid this problem by performing a series of studies to understand
which images and image pairs users prefer and selecting images that avoid any type of explicit or implicit bias, resulting in an
eective password space that is essentially the same as the total password space.
In a three weeks user study with 21 participants comparing SemanticLock against other authentication systems, we
discovered that SemanticLock outperformed or matched both PIN and PATTERN on speed, memorability, user acceptance
and usability. Furthermore, qualitative tests also show that SemanticLock was rated superior in likeability. SemanticLock was
also evaluated while participants walked unencumbered and walked encumbered carrying “everyday” items to analyze the
eects of such activities on its usage.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Mobile devices, being the de facto personal communication device, are ubiquitous within our society [50] . We
depend on these devices to store substantial amounts of condential information and perform activities such as
emailing, social networking, personal internet banking, and entertainment. All mobile devices manufactured in
the last decade come with a default set of authentication or login mechanisms. Research by Micallef et al[33],
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shows that over 64% of users chose not to secure or use an authentication system on their mobile devices [28].
However, it has been suggested that users may not assign signicance to the information existing on their mobile
devices[2], other arguments, such as that made by [33], suggest that users dislike the inconvenience of repeatedly
unlocking their mobile devices. Moreover, those who choose to use their mobile device unlocking mechanisms
are discouraged by the time and eort it takes to unlock these devices or the frustrating unlock failure errors
observed [41]. In general, research has shown that the behaviour, engagement, and interest of the users have
a major impact on the eective security level of their mobile devices, with many users preferring to sacrice
security for convenience[13]. Studies by [14, 32], indicate that the distribution of text passwords chosen by
users eectively have very low entropy, meaning that the actual space of passwords most users choose from
is much smaller than the total space available. Prominent authentication systems such as PIN [27, 30, 48] and
PATTERN [27, 46, 53] have being extensively studied; and have a large body of existing literature [48, 49]. e
PIN authentication system (see Fig.1(a)), which is a numeric display of numbers inpued by discrete touches on
the screen and the PATTERN authentication system (see Fig.1(b)), which is a “grid-like” display of nodes whose
password paern is selected by a continuous nger movement across the screen to connect the secret password
nodes, are both plagued with numerous usage and security issues [1, 3, 34, 53]. e popularity of touch-screen
based mobile devices allows for graphical authentication techniques that oer possibilities of providing passwords
that are eectively stronger than text passwords.
Recently, researchers have developed and studied various graphical authentication systems[2, 5, 19, 43, 50]
that take advantage of the inherent human memorability properties and have aempted to mitigate factors
such as low password distribution; low unlock speed, medium-to-low entropy and other biases, without much
success. Our technique strives to improve on memorability[16, 27] while signicantly increasing unlock speed,
password distribution and password entropy. In this paper, we present SemanticLock, a single factor graphical
(a) PIN (b) Paern (c) PIN Shuled
Fig. 1. Prominent mobile device authentication systems
authentication method for touchscreen mobile devices. Our solution works by providing the user with a way to
unlock their mobile devices by joining images via discrete or continuous nger movements to create a semantically
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memorable story that represents a password (see Fig. 2 ). SemanticLock can create a strong memorable password
with just two discrete nger movements allowing the user to construct a semantically meaningful password
quickly ( see Fig. 2(b) ) from the provided images. In the SemanticLock scheme, a password is a sequence of k
images selected by the user to make a “story”, from a single set of n ¿ k images, each non-intrinsically related and
placed in position p; in one of four locations around a pre-existing image. For two pairs selected from n images
this yields 4n(n − 1)(4(n − 2)(n − 3) + 6(n − 2)) choices, where the second term in the inner sum accounts for one
of the images for the rst pair being selected as the target image for the second pair. For the mobile devices such
as phones, six images allows for comfortable use, yielding 8640 passwords, so the practical implementation will
rely on login false aempt limitation counter-measures.
To increase the entropy of the selected password distribution, we ensured that we reduced password image bias
by performing a two week preliminary study with the goal of eliminating disproportionately popular images and
image pairs. In that study, our participants were required to match intrinsically related password images from
a set of 40 images that were initially selected from diverse categories (see Fig. 3). We subsequently obtained 6
“least intrinsically” related images from that study and used them during another 7 days SemanticLock password
creation study (see Fig. 4). is user study positively reveals that our SemanticLock signicantly has a highly
uniform password distribution, signifying a high password entropy.
(a) (b)
Fig. 2. Semantic-lock: (a) Default view for login and setup. (b) Login: the user drags two images to meet a third image.
In this case, Cup is dragged to right side of Person (movement “A”), then Blackboard is dragged to right side of Cup
(movement “B”). Login can be done with two quick movements (A,B).
In designing the SemanticLock system; we set out to develop a system that was easy to use and quick to login.
erefore our primary focuses were speed, ease of use, and memorability. In addition, we expect our solution to
perform consistently across all usage environments and situations our users may nd themselves. Our study
involved scenarios such as siing, walking unencumbered, and encumbered. We ensured that SemanticLock
requires only two distinct swipes or nger movements to construct a login password, and we implemented a close
proximity “sticky” feature that visually highlights the two images that are in close proximity to each other while
the user is actively dragging one of the images. If the user releases this image; it automatically “glides” towards
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the closest image and “sticks” to it. is feature greatly reduces errors caused by unsteady nger movements
and increases overall login speeds. e SemanticLock also inherits the discrete and continuous nger movement
properties of the PIN and PATTERN authentication system respectively. However, in contrast to PATTERN
authentication system, SemanticLock only requires two short swipes rather than one continuous long swipe.
For our study, we utilized the dataset we collected during a three week period and, we show that while
SemanticLock can be practically more secure than the PIN and PATTERN authentication systems, its performance
is signicantly beer than the PIN and similar to PATTERN under normal circumstances but exceedingly beer
in ideal scenarios.
e rest of this paper is structured as follows. We describe related work in Section 2. In Section 3, we describe
our methodology in more detail, such as the preliminary web-based studies, the graphical password schemes
that we evaluated during the mobile device study, and experimental design. In Section 4, we introduced our data
sources and data collection models. In Section 5,6,7,8 we discuss issues and ndings and present our results for
them, including study limitations in Section 9. Finally, we conclude in Section 10.
2 RELATED WORKS ON AUTHENTICATION METHODS
User authentication and access control are very important in today‘s electronic world. e advent of personal
computing and mobile devices has made security a foremost consideration in the design and usage of these
devices. While authentication can existing in many forms, there are three core types of authentication categories
with which a user can be identied by a system. ese categories are namely : What you know, What you have
and What you are. e practical implementation of these categories are the text and graphical passwords, token
based passwords, and biometric passwords. We shall examine the history and various studies pertaining to text
and graphical password implementations.
2.1 Text Based Passwords
Alphanumeric text-based passwords have dominated human-computer authentication since the 1960s [20], where
keyboards were used to input user passwords. With the emergence of mobile devices with 10 digit keypads [48],
the use of numeric-based PIN passwords became mainstream. First generation touch-screen based smart-phones
featured numerous variants of PIN-based password systems [16, 26], and has been used by all mobile device
form factors [2, 14, 23] and remains very popular with users. Although the text-based and the PIN passwords
have high theoretical password spaces, numerous studies, such as those by Bonneau et. al [11], and Melicher
et.al[32] show that the practical password spaces and entropy are very low due to user security behaviours. In a
study by [11], it was shown, based on available large public dataset of PINs, that 29% of the selected 4-PIN and
6-PIN passwords correspond to a date based sequence. is reduces the practical password space of PIN passwords.
For many years the security literature lacked sound methodology and ecological validity [24] to answer
elementary questions about practical password distribution, or the eects of demographic properties on their
outcome, and it remained an open question as to the extent to which passwords are weak due to a lack of
motivation or inherent user limitations [9, 10]. e massive disclosure of millions of real-life user passwords
in hacked password databases [8, 29, 47] from several websites such as RockYou, Yahoo, Hotmail, Flirtlife and
Computerbits, exposed an enormous gap between a real password distribution and the theoretical space of
passwords. Furthermore, analyses by Malone et.al [31] observed that security motivations such as registering
payment cards or supplying sensitive nancial information did not aect the users tendency to create weak
passwords. In the nal analysis, practical user passwords distribution is skewed to provide low password
entropy and protection. Additionally, studies by Melicher et.al [32] conrm that this paern of skewed password
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distribution and low password entropy is worse with mobile devices users due to additional restrictive factors
inherent with using mobile devices.
2.2 Graphical Passwords
A graphical password, a term introduced by Blonder [7], is an authentication system that is presented to the user
via a graphical user interface (GUI), and from a smart mobile device perspective, this GUI includes a touch-screen
system that enables easy interaction with the objects displayed on the GUI. Graphical passwords provide a
promising alternative to traditional alphanumeric passwords. ey are aractive and intuitive since people
usually remember shapes and images beer than random words or text. In recent years, various studies have
categorized graphical authentication methods into 3 main categories, which are :
Recall: e Recall graphical authentication system gets its origin from works done on Draw-a-Secret[53],
Pass-Go [44] and other similar systems. It is shown to be a memory intensive task [6] due to the fact that
the secret diagram or paern initially drawn by the user has to be entirely remembered and reproduced,
but the advantage of Recall is that it benets from the inherent motor memory of the users and our
superior ability to recall shapes and paerns[23, 46]. e Android Paern password system is recall-based.
Recognition: e recognition graphical authentication systems revolves around the ability of the user to
’recognize’ sets of images from among decoys, that had been selected earlier during the initial creation of
the passwords. Recognition based systems such as Passfaces [12, 40] , De´ja` vu [21] have been extensively
studied.
Cued-recall: Cued-recall based systems exploit various studies that conclude that the human memory
holds information that may be available yet inaccessible for retrieval without the proper trigger or catalyst
[18]. is system based on the idea that pictorial indicators can simplify the task of recall for a user [46].
Cued-recall based systems such as PassPoint[51] and Cue Click Points(CCP) [17] have been extensively
studied.
In this paper, our study compares the performance metrics of the SemanticLock authentication system when
compared with the Android Paern and PIN authentication systems. We therefore examined existing literature
to nd studies similar to ours.
In a study by von Zezschwitz et al. [50], three custom graphical authentication systems were compared against
the PATTERN authentication system. e aim was to study their prototypes’ unlock speed, level of memorability,
usability and user acceptance. Results conrmed that PATTERN authentication system was superior to their
proposed prototypes in regards to unlock speed,and performed comparatively similar in regards to usability,user
acceptance and memorability but was considered less secure by the users. e PIN authentication system was not
included in their study. e eective password distribution or password space was not evaluated in this study. In
a later study, von Zezschwitz et al [49] compared the PIN and Paern authentication system, and the results
indicated that PIN had a faster unlock speed and smaller error rate, but the Paern was more usable, memorable
and likeable. However, studies of user Paern password creation by [4, 45, 46], found empirically that there is a
high bias in the Paern selection process resulting in low entropy and a practical eective security of less than a
three digit randomly-assigned PIN.
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More recently Aly et al [2] introduced SpinLock, a technique that is based on a physical combination lock, and
requires users to rotate a dial both counter-clockwise and clockwise alternatively to select a password token.
is design is meant to make it usable but without sacricing security. eir study with 21 participants using
SpinLock in 63 trials with various degrees of password complexity show that it has led to signicantly lower
time performance than Paern Lock and only achieved the similar performance with PIN. eir participants
thought that SpinLock was more usable and enjoyable to use.
2.3 Eects of Mobility and Activity on Authentication Experience
Not much research is available on the eects of mobility and encumbrance while using mobile devices, especially
to unlock them. Users of mobile devices rarely focus all their aention on their mobile devices, but their aention
is divided [35]. Ng et al [38] in their initial study, discovered that mobile phone users simultaneously carry or
hold other items while interacting with their devices in public and these users tend to carry shopping bags and
boxes oen. Additional studies by Ng et al. [36], had users clicking on “crosses” or target points that randomly
appear on the screen to study the eects of encumbrance and walking on the user’s targeting accuracy while
walking and compared to when the user stood still. ey determined that targeting error rates increased by
112% for the those walking. Wilson et al.[52] and others [22, 25, 42] found users were markedly less accurate at
targeting on mobile devices and selection time would increase signicantly when encumbered or walking while
interacting with a mobile phone regardless of input hand posture[39].
3 METHODOLOGY
We employed two strategies in an aempt to achieve the desired features and functions of our previously described
SemanticLock system. Pre-system development analysis and experiments are required in order to derive initial
icon sets. erefore two studies were conducted, a web-based study and an Android-based study. Both studies
are discussed below.
3.1 Web-based Study : Password icon selection and practical space evaluation
For this study, we utilized a web-based interface that was designed using HTML5 , PHP and MySQL database
back-end technologies. is allowed us to implement icon drag-n-drop actions that are common on touch-screen
based mobile devices. is web-based approach allowed us to collect a large amount of data from our participants
in various locations and use this data to determine various types of icon selection and password space evaluations.
Although web-based experiments are harder to control than laboratory or supervised eld studies [6], this channel
of data collection meets our requirements and oers numerous advantages. e below sections oer further
details of our experiments.
3.1.1 Goals.
As part of our goals in the design of our Semantic-lock system, our initial intention is to avoid any implicitly
induced biases in the researcher‘s selection of the password icons that may lower the entropy or reduce the
achievable password space[20]. In general, security experts have observed that an authentication systems
theoretical password space is never optimally achieved during practical usage[15], and there is a need to determine
the actual practical password space that determines the ecological validity of such an authentication system. We
dene two stages of experiment to achieve the above stated objectives, and implemented these stages with two
dierent groups of participants. e output of the analysis of the dataset collected in the rst stage was utilized
during the second stage. No demographic data was collect from the participant during these stages.
3.1.2 Participants.
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For Stage 1 study, we engaged 372 participants, a large number of them were students at the university campus,
but we ensured that 40% non-student persons, of all age groups, also participated in this study. Our participant
group included 45% female users; we did not collect any further demographic information such as academic
background , computer skills or their experience with mobile devices or authentication systems. e participants
were not informed of the nal purpose of the study , they were only told to ’pair’ icons they felt were related, the
reason or logic of this relationship was based on their discretion.
For Stage 2 study, we engaged 184 participants, 70% were students within the university campus and the rest
were non-students. Our web portal included a 3 minute training video, and each participant was encouraged to
watch the video before aempting to create passwords. We advised our participants to create at least 3 passwords
each. Our participant group included 18% female users; we did not collect any further demographic information
such as academic background , computer skills or their experience with mobile devices or authentication systems.
3.1.3 Experiment Design [Stage 1]: Acquisition of Independent password Icons. Our initial process was to
provide a set of 40 icons that were drawn from various categories and genres. We pointedly avoided icons that had
major gender signicant colors, cultural, national or religious relevance. Our participants were then presented
Fig. 3. Related Icon Pairing Web-page: Our online web page allowed our participants to select 2 icons that they felt were
related. They dragged these icons into the ”pairboxes“. The collected data set was used to select 6 non-related password icons
with a web-based interface that displayed these icons on a 10 by 4 grid; with each icon randomly positioned in
dierent grid-cells during every selection session to prevent locational bias. Participants were required to create
10 sets of ”icons-pairs” that they believed were related by dragging these icons into the provided ‘pairboxes‘ (see
g. 3). Each participant was allowed multiple iterations.
We analyzed the 1039 collected pair-datasets to extract 6 icons that were the least intrinsically related. ese
”non-intrinsically” related icons were used in the next stage of the experiment.
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3.1.4 Experiment Design [Stage 2]: Evaluation of practical password space.
Our primary goal was to quantify the eect of a participant’s choice on the security of passwords chosen.
Every authentication scheme has an entropy and the strength of such entropy is determined by the probability
distribution associated with the password space. Ideally this distribution is approximately uniform. At this
stage of our experiment we presented a web-based interface displaying the six derived non-intrinsically related
password icons on a 9 by 6 celled grid to our participants (see g. 4(a) ). Our participants were required to create
several semantic passwords with the password icons by dragging a chosen icon to the le, top, right or boom
position of an associated stationary icon (see g. 4(b) ) .
(a) (b)
Fig. 4. Semantic-lock Web-based Password Creator: (a) Default view of icon placement. (b) Creating Password: the
user drags the “cheese” to meet the stationary “bole” icon. In this case, “cheese” is also dragged to right side of “bole”.
Lastly a three-icon password is shown (see black circle)
3.1.5 Data Collection and Analysis.
e data collected from the participants during stage two of the web-based study has been analyzed to derive
the below information:
Password Icon distribution: Frequency analysis was performed on the semantic password data sets
collected during stage two of the study. Each semantic password is made up of unique icons selected
from the 6 initial password icons. From our data set of 785 semantically created passwords, our analysis
suggests that the choice of each of the six password icons is uniformly distributed (see g. 5(a)), which is
a strong indication that our semantic-lock system does not suer any bias that may aect its practical
password space.
Password Icon pair distribution: As each semantic password is composed of two or more sets of pass-
word icons, we pre-processed the collected data sets and decomposed semantic passwords that consist of
more than two password icons into two pairs of password icons and performed frequency analysis on
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these password icon pairs. Our analysis shows a uniform distribution of password icon pairs (see g. 6).
Our participant‘s selections were not biased or skewed.
Password Icon-pair position distribution: As explained previously, all semantic passwords, consists of
two or more sets of password icons. As such, these password icons are used to create semantic passwords
by dragging a selected password icon to a “resting position‘ next to the stationary password icon. is
“resting position“ could either be the le, top, right or boom of a stationary password icon. We analyzed
the collected positional data sets to determine if our participants displayed a bias in their choice of “resting
positions“. Our analysis indicated that the participant selection of “resting positions“ was fairly uniform
with a small bias against the le, which is somewhat expected from predominantly right handed users.
(a) (b)
Fig. 5. Semantic-lock Data Analysis: (a) Chart shows the analysis of the password Icon usage. (b) Drag-To Positions: This
chart show the analysis of the dragged Icon resting or drag-to position on the stationary Icon
3.2 Mobile Device Study
Our mobile device study made use of the Android platform. We developed a mobile version of the interface
that was used during our web-based study. We also developed Android versions of the Paern and PIN lock
authentication systems since these authentication systems will be our baseline or control for this study due
to their popularity and large body of research literature about their performance. We developed an additional
application to help us convey the testing and survey to our participants in a uniform and predictable way.
It allowed participants to view an initial training video, assigned a unique participant ID that allowed us to
correlate data across Login techniques on participant basis and also presented the pre-survey and post-survey
questionnaires in the proper sequences while implementing the Latin square approach to counterbalance the
order of the techniques (see Fig. 7).
3.2.1 Goals. Our goal during this three week study, which involved 21 participants in an indoor environment,
was to collect both qualitative and quantitative data which would provide insight into our participant’s perception
of the likeability, usability, memorability and login speed of the 3 authentication approaches:
• SemanticLock
• Paern Lock
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Fig. 6. Icon-Pair selection Analysis : The distribution of “Icon-Pair” selection within the password icon data sets. The
chart shows a “uniform” distribution, indicating a strong password entropy.
• PIN
e prototypes, shown in (Fig. 1 and Fig. 2), meet our goal of ensuring compatibility with Android 6.0 and
above, while meeting the requirements of working on phone and tablet form-factors. e training mode option
allowed users to receive adequate training and practice before the actual testing. During the testing, a participant’s
activities such as touches, password tokens, strokes, pauses, timings, aborts and errors were logged for further
analysis.
3.2.2 Participants. We recruited 21 participants (15 females) from a local university. e data from our pre-
testing survey reveals that 51% of the participants were between the ages of 17 to 22 and all our participants were
right-handed. All were active users of iPhone (31%) and Android (66%) mobile phones. 55% of them used a phone
with ngerprint sensor, while 17% used the PIN, 14% Paern and, the remaining 14% did not use authentication.
50% of our participants claim the input hand posture they preferred to use depended on the situation and the
app in question; 27% claimed they preferred to use two hands to operate their mobile devices. All participated
voluntarily without any nancial remuneration.
3.2.3 Experimental Design.
Our goal was to compare three main techniques and their interactions with other independent variables. To do
this, we followed a within-participants design. Below are the variables we are tracking:
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(a) User Study Admin App (b) User Survey estion (c) Post Test In-App Survey (d) Post Test Survey
Fig. 7. Survey App Framework : The survey framework app allowed us to provide a consistent process to all participants.
(a) The main menu used Latin Squares to present the test options. (b) pre-test survey collected user demographics and
preferences. (c) Post-test survey specific to the system just tested. (d) Post-test general Survey, to collect user’s overall
opinions
e independent variables are :
• Technique
• Device Form-Factor
• Physical Posture
• Hand Posture
e dependent variables are :
• Login Speed
• Pre-Login Delay Time
• Error Rate
• User usability and acceptance
Technique: Our experiment compared three techniques. e task required of each participant was to enter
the password tokens as fast as possible during each session, whereby we implicitly collected and tracked
data and meta-data for further empirical analysis. We assigned password tokens for each technique so
that each participant would use a suciently strong password properly distributed within the space of
possible passwords. We aempted to ensure that the password tokens given for each technique had
relatively the same password strength.
For the PIN Technique we issued a series of 4 digit password tokens, having a possible theoretical pass-
word space of 10,000 . 4-6 digit passwords represent the range of what most people would use in mobile
devices and other platforms (e.g., ATM PINs). For the Paern Technique, we assigned a series of irregular
and widely distributed paerns with a 5 connected nodes, giving us a theoretical space range of 7000. For
the SemanticLock technique we issued a series of randomly generated passwords along with some seman-
tic interpretation that would enhance memorability, with a theoretical password space of 8640 possibilities.
Device Form-Factor: Mobile devices come in various dimensions. We used two dierent form-factors:
• 5.2” LG Nexus 5X phone • 10.2” Google Pixel C tablet
e tablet was only used during the Seated session (Fig, 8 (a)) of the experiment, while the LG phone was
used for all sessions(Fig.8 ( b),(c )).
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(a) (b) (c)
Fig. 8. Participants in the Study: (a)Participant performing a Seated Test using the Tablet. (b) User in walking unencum-
bered. (c) encumbered posture while using the single hand main thumb input posture.
Physical Posture: Studies show that the physical posture of users has an eect on the way they use the
devices [35, 36, 38]. erefore in this study we included 3 physical postures:
Seated: is posture required participants to sit on a comfortable chair and operate the mobile device
on a table and could use one or two hands (see Fig. 8(a)).
Walking Unencumbered: is posture implied that the person operating the mobile device was also
walking but without carrying any other objects with their hands or arms (see Fig 8(b)).
Walking Encumbered: is posture took place when participants would operate a mobile device while
carrying other items such as books or bags with their hands or arms (see Fig 8(c)).
Recent studies have shown that walking encumbered or unencumbered and operating a mobile device
had shown signicant eects on the usage paern of mobile devices [37, 39, 42]
Hand Posture: Hand Posture denes how a mobile phone is held when in use by the user. ere are 3
prominent input postures: one-handed preferred thumb, two-handed index nger and two-handed both
thumbs (see Fig. 9). With the advent of larger mobile phone screens, many users have had to change
from the one hand input posture to the two-handed input posture [37, 39].
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(a) One-handed thumb (b) two-handed index finger (c) two-handed both thumbs
Fig. 9. Input Hand Postures: The most common hand postures when using mobile devices. These postured were tested
during the Study.
3.2.4 Task and Procedures. Our rst step was to inform the participants about the condentiality of their
supplied information and to explain the purpose of the project and the tasks they would need to do. We provided
a three minute training video to each participant (see Fig. 7a), aer which they were allowed to practice each
technique a couple of times. ey practiced the creation of a password and the use the password to log in into
the mobile device. We emphasized the need for a speedy login during the actual testing phase.
Week 1 (First Phase): Each participant was required to answer a pre-test questionnaire before commenc-
ing the test (see Fig. 7b). We allowed each participant to choose password tokens for each technique
from our supplied list. If the participant entered a wrong password, the application alerted them to
enter the correct password again. e average time for participants to complete all techniques (including
questionnaires) was 4 minutes. e experiment nished with a Likert questionnaire (see Fig. 7c) that
collected qualitative data about how the participants’ perceived usability, error-handling, security and
likeability of each technique. e next week’s session was a seated session and the participants used the
techniques on the LG mobile phone and the Google tablet. e main independent variable was technique
(PIN, Paern and SemanticLock) and mobile form factor (phone and tablet). Each participant had to enter
a total of 9 passwords per session, 3 for each Technique and participants were allowed a 60 second rest in
between techniques to avoid fatigue.
Week 2 (Second Phase): In the second phase, we explore the memorability of the techniques where we
asked the same participants to recall the passwords they had used for each technique the week before.
During this session we tracked error-rates, type-of-error, action-delay times, login speed required for our
future analysis.
Week 3 (ird Phase): We recalled the participants for a third session that required them to perform log
in activities while walking around a predened path within an indoor environment. We followed certain
practices and insights from [37, 38] in which they examined the eect of mobility and encumbrance on
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participants using both one and two-handed interactions on touchscreen mobile devices. e walking
speed was paced by a researcher who used a metronome to ensure a proper walking speed was maintained
. Aer the walking test (see Fig 8(b)), each participant undertook the encumbrance test, which required
each participant to walk along a path at a paced speed carrying two nylon bags containing a 100cl plastic
bole, while unlocking the device using each technique (see Fig 8(c)). e decision to use nylon bags
was informed by the research done by Ng et al. [38]. In this phase, we sought to investigate the eect
of mobility and encumbrance on the login speed, memorability and input errors while assessing the
techniques with the 3 commonly used input postures as discovered in a research by [39].
4 DATA COLLECTION & MEASUREMENT
We collected data for a number of dependent variables and used this data to compare techniques.
4.1 Pre-Login Delay time: Memorability & Usability
Pre-login delay is the elapsed time between when the participant indicated that they were ready to start unlocking
the device and the actual entry of the password. is data provides a view into evaluating the memorability
and usability of the system. Studies by Stobert et al.[43] dened a direct relationship between memorability and
pre-login delay time. We analyze this data to quantify the level of memorability and usability.
4.2 Login Speed
e time period used to complete each trial of the login process for a technique was recorded. is measurement
only recorded successful trials; failed trials were recorded as singular failure events. login speed was tracked
from the moment a participant starts password token entry until the entry was completed successfully.
4.3 Error Rate
e error rate was measured as a percentage of failed login aempts to the total number of aempts required to
complete the technique’s session. e number of failed login aempts during a trial did not aect the number of
trials that constituted a complete session. at is, some techniques required three successful trials to constitute a
session while other techniques, such as the PIN and SemanticLock; required 6 successful trials to complete a
session.
4.4 Subjective Data
We collected pre-test, in-test and post-test surveys via an electronic questionnaire (see Fig.7 (b,c,d)). e questions
focused on ease of use, perception of speed, likelihood of adoption, error recovery, and interface usability. We
implemented the questionnaire in electronic form and used a 5-point Likert questions for some aspects of the
questionnaire.
5 RESULTS
5.1 Login Speed
e mean values of the login speed of each technique and other independent factors are shown in Table 2.
e results show that the SemanticLock performed beer than the other techniques across device form factors
and postures. SemanticLock was superior in performance to PIN across all independent variables. ere was
a statistically signicant dierence between the techniques login speed as determined by one-way ANOVA
(F(4,535) = 170.44, p = .000). A Tukey post hoc test revealed that Semantic-lock (807.06 ± 167.23 ms, p = .000) was
signicantly faster than Paern and PIN (both p ¡ .000).
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Table 1. Average login speed (milliseconds) across posture and technique
Pattern PIN Semantic-lock
Seated (Tablet) 785 1516 590
Seated (Phone) 825 1570 652
Walking umb 1135 1885 853
Walking Index 916 1395 708
Walking 2 umbs 945 1208 768
Walking-E umb 1175 1736 917
Walking-E Index 800 1474 910
Walking-E 2 umbs 873 1147 655
Note: Walking-E = Walking Encumbered
5.2 Dierence across Device Form Factors
As stated earlier, we used two dierent types of device form-factors during the “seated” session (a Nexus 5 phone
and a Google Pixel C tablet (see Fig. 10 (a)). Results of a two-way ANOVA show that there was no signicant
eect of device form-factor ( F(1,530) = .003, p = .995) on login speed across techniques. Furthermore there was
no signicant interaction eect between device form-factor and login technique (F(4,530) = 1.208, p = .306), (see
Fig. 11 (a))
(a) Login speed while seated with dierent device form (b) Login Speed while Encumbered
Fig. 10. Charts of Login Speed .
5.3 Dierences across Physical Postures
Our participants assumed three dierent physical postures (seated, walking and walking-encumbered). Results of
a two-way ANOVA show that there was no signicant eect of posture ( F(2,1485) = 1.189, p = .305) on login
speed across Llgin techniques (see Fig. 11 (a and b)). However, there was a signicant interaction eect between
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physical posture and login technique ( F(8,1485) = 3.302, p = .001), with participants having a faster speed using
the Paern method while seated. Further analysis of the data with the seated posture data excluded, and using a
two-way ANOVA to examine the eect of walking posture (unencumbered or encumbered) and login technique
on login speed show that there was no signicant eect of walking posture ( F(1,950) = 1.757, p = .185) on login
speed across login techniques (see Fig. 10 (b)). Furthermore there was no signicant interaction eect between
walking posture and login technique ( F(4,950) = 1.660, p = .157).
(a) Login Speed compared on Device Form-factor for
each Technique.
(b) Login Speed compared on Physical Posture for each
Technique.
Fig. 11. Login Speed vs Technique: Login Speed compared on (a) Device Form-factor or (b) Physical Posture independent
variables.
5.4 Dierences across Input Hand Postures
Our participants while walking either unencumbered or encumbered assumed three dierent input hand postures
(OneHandumb, TwoHands2umbs, OneHandOtherIndex) during the testing of the Login Technique (see Fig. 9).
Results of a two-way ANOVA conducted to examine the eect of Input Hand posture and login technique on
login speed shows that there was a signicant eect of Input Hand posture ( F(2,945) = 59.318, p = .000) on login
speed across login techniques (see Fig. 12 (a)). Furthermore there was a signicant interaction eect between
input hand posture and login technique ( F(8,945) = 2.973, p = .003). A Tukey post hoc test revealed that the
TwoHand2umb posture (1357 ms, p = .000) was statistically signicantly faster than OneHandumb, but there
was no statistically signicant dierence between the TwoHand2umb and OneHandOtherIndex posture (1360
ms, p = .965).
5.5 Pre-Login Delay Time
Our participants experience a time delay between when the trial started and when an initial action or interaction
was made. is pre-login delay time should give an indication of familiarity, memorability or ease of use of the
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techniques. SemanticLock had the lowest pre-login delay time across all hand input postures (see Fig. 12 (b)). e
ANOVA test results showed a signicant main eect for hand input posture, (F(2,930) = 9.877, p ¡ 0.05), where the
Twohand2umb had a signicantly lower pre-login time than the OneHandumb but there was no signicant
dierence with the OneHandOtherIndex (p= 0.624).
(a) Login Speed compared on Input Hand Posture for
each Technique
(b) Pre-Login Delay Time compared on Input Hand Pos-
ture for each Technique
Fig. 12. Login speeds and delay for the three techniques
6 ERROR RATE
A two-way ANOVA was conducted to examine the error rate for each technique. ere was no signicant eect
of interaction by these independent variables on the error rate. Furthermore analysis showed that error rate was
lowest for all hand input postures when using SemanticLock and there was no signicant dierence in the error
rate of the Paern technique (p = .925 ). Additionally, results shows that the PIN had the lowest error rates when
walking unencumbered (see Fig. 13 (a)). It should be noted that data from the participants ”seated” sessions was
excluded from this walking analysis due to certain inconsistencies in the delity of the data. Error rates across all
techniques indicates that participants in the seated position had the lowest error rates while the participants
using two-handed both thumbs while walking unencumbered had the highest error rates (see Fig. 13 (b)). Error
rates classied by techniques show that Paern (27%) had the highest error rates, followed by SemanticLock
(19%), and PIN(4%) (see Fig. 14 (a)).
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(a) Error Rate compared on walking across all techniques
(b) Error Rate compared across all techniques grouped
by posture
Fig. 13. Error Rates
7 QUALITATIVE RESULTS
e results are based on a 5-point Likert scale questionnaire and subsequent user rankings of the three techniques.
Each participant prior to the experiment answered an electronic pre-test survey which we used to obtain
demographics, personal information, and mobile device usage experience. e Likert scaled questions were
answered aer the trial of each technique to collect their subjective preferences. At the end a user ranking of all
techniques was collected (see Fig. 14 (b)). e data we collected was analyzed using the Friedman test and we
performed post hoc analysis with Wilcoxon signed-rank test with Bonferroni correction (p= 0.05/3 = 0.017) of
those that are statistically signicant. In the questionnaire we probed aspects of the users experience with the
three login techniques.
7.1 Speed
Our participants experience with each technique’s speed shows there was a statistically signicant dierence
in speed depending on Technique (χ 2(2) = 18.321, p = 0.000) (see Fig. 15(a)). Post hoc analysis indicated that
there were no signicant dierences between PIN and Paern trials (Z = -2.101, p = 0.036) or between PIN and
SemanticLock trials (Z = -1.560, p = 0.119). However, there was signicant dierence in speed between Paern
and SemanticLock trials (Z = -3.573, p = 0.000).
7.2 Good Feedback
Participants experience with the feedback for each technique also showed that there was a signicant dierence
(χ 2(2) = 17.179, p = 0.000) (see Fig. 15(c)). ere were signicant dierences between Paern and SemanticLock as
well as PIN and Paern; Paern were ranked favorably in both cases.
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7.3 Likeability
Post hoc analysis indicated that there was no signicant dierence in how well participants liked the techniques
(see Fig. 14 (b)).
(a) Error Rates for each Technique (b) The normalized User ranking. (Lower is beer)
Fig. 14. Error rates and user ranking survey.
7.4 Usability
ere was a signicant dierence in perceived ease of use of technique (χ 2(2) = 14.22, p = 0.001). Post hoc analysis
indicated that there were no signicant dierences between the PIN and Paern (Z = -1.672, p = 0.94) or between
the PIN and Semantic (Z = -1.628, p = 0.103) (see Fig. 15(b)). However, there was a signicant increase in perceived
ease of use between Paern and SemanticLock (Z = -3.140, p = 0.002).
7.5 Error Recovery
ere was a signicant dierence in error recovery based on technique (χ 2(2) = 12.667, p = 0.002). Signicant
dierences were found between Paern and Semantic as well as PIN and SemanticLock. In both cases, Paern
and PIN were ranked favorably in regards to ease of error recovery. ere was no signicant dierence in how
participants liked interacting with the techniques (see Fig. 15(d)).
8 DISCUSSION
8.1 Login Speed
Our participants performed beer, but not signicantly, in login speed using Paern than SemanticLock.
e subjective data indicated that our participants ranked SemanticLock as the slowest, but this was contrary
to the quantitative results (see Fig. 15(a)). We initially expected that SemanticLock would be faster than Paern
based on our observations, as SemanticLock only involves two swipes. Familiarity with the Paern unlocking
mechanism may explain part of this outcome.
8.2 Error rates
Our participants experienced the lowest error rate when seated and using their preferred Hand Input posture.
Interestingly we also discovered that during the walking session PIN had the lowest error rate across all techniques.
Participants ranked the techniques based on how easy was to recover from errors in this order: Paern (43%),
PIN (17%), and SemanticLock (9%).
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(a) Fast Speed (b) Easy to use
(c) Good Feedback (d) Error Recovery
Fig. 15. antitative Results
8.3 Memorability Test
Our participants displayed varying levels of diculty in recalling their passwords. 70% of the participants did not
recall their Paern passwords, 50% did not recall their PIN passwords while 10% did not recall their SemanticLock
password. is is an indication that the SemanticLock was more memorable to the participants.
8.4 Key Lessons
Our study has provided us data from which we have learnt the following:
• Graphical authentication systems based on discrete and continuous movements out perform other
authentication systems solely on one or the other. e potential of SemanticLock to be faster that the
PATTERN is aributed to these dual movement properties.
• Authentication systems based on core graphical tokens with mnemonic properties result in higher
memorability values.
• SemanticLock performed excellently during the walking test. e results for both walking encumbered
and unencumbered were satisfactory.
• Error recovery is strongly inuenced by system design. We determined that graphical user interactivity
and user familiarity greatly reduces the error rates
• e SemanticLock had the smallest pre-login delay time, which means that the participants found it
easier to recall their password than other techniques.
• SemanticLock performed beer than the PIN lock while having a slightly similar performance with the
Paern lock.
• e type of device used by the participants i.e. phone or tablet had no eect on their performance.
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• e hand posture used by participants aected their login speed performance but this eect was uniform
across techniques.
9 STUDY LIMITATIONS
Since we only had 3 weeks to perform this study, we were not able to evaluate the long term memorability eects
and also training eects of the techniques. We believe that the SemanticLock performance would have beneted
from a longer term study period. In regards to generalization, it is important to know that the sample size may
have had eect on the results, but due to adequate planning of the study and large numbers of trials we can
maintain that our data is valid.
10 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this study, we explored a new screen lock concept based on semantic constructs; we used a set of graphical
images as password tokens, this also enhances password memorability. e user is able to create a password using
a quick action of dragging and dropping image tokens into their respective positions either as a discrete movement
or in a continuous ow on the touchscreen. e large number of possible semantic constructs derived from
the positioning of the image tokens and the varieties of images to choose from gave our system a theoretically
large password space and our selection of icons gave it a large practical password space. During our three week
user study we engaged 21 participants and provided them our SemanticLock and other authentication systems
to run a range of comparative tests, whose results have been discussed earlier in this paper. To conclude, the
SemanticLock generally had superior performance compared to PATTERN and PIN authentication techniques on
key metrics. Our future work is to continue to expand on the areas of the technique where improvements can
be achieved. It is also equally important to expand the size of the participants and the period of the research
while further integrating the SemanticLock system as the default authentication mechanism; so that our future
participants can enjoy a more natural usage experience during the next future study.
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